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Recent Developments
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-AIRLINE DEREGULATION-DEREGULATORY
SCHEME HAD No EFFECT ON THE APPLICABLE SUBSTANTIVE
LAW TO DETERMINE LIABILITY OF SHIPPER FOR
LOST SHIPMENT OF GOODS
First Pennsylvania Bank v. Eastern Airlines (1984)
Inspired by the prospect of competitive market forces determining
the quality and prices of air services, Congress, in the late 1970's, under-
took the complicated task of deregulating the airline industry.' Despite
the potential for much litigation, few courts have addressed the various
legal aspects of deregulation as of yet.2 The Third Circuit, however, in
1. See Air Cargo Deregulation Act (ACDA), Pub. L. No. 95-163, 91 Stat.
1278-89 (1977) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1982)); Airline
Deregulation Act (ADA), Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705-54 (1978) (codified
as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1982)). The ACDA and ADA, passed in
1977 and 1978 respectively, effectively dismantled the existing government reg-
ulatory scheme for the airline industry. See generally Comment, Limitations on Air
Carrier Liability: An Inadvertent Return to Common Law Principles, 48J. AIR L. & COM.
111 (1982).
For a further discussion of the effect of the ACDA, see infra notes 37-40 and
accompanying text. For a further discussion of the ADA, see infra notes 41-45
and accompanying text.
2. The limited number of postderegulation cases have focused on the scope
of the CAB's remaining authority. See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. CAB,
667 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (effect of deregulation on CAB's application of
safety and fitness standards not substantial); Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. CAB,
643 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1981) (standards used by CAB in considering applications
to conduct new service substantially unchanged by ADA); Frontier Air Lines v.
CAB, 621 F.2d 369 (10th Cir. 1980) (after deregulation, when carrier stops serv-
icing a route, CAB has authority to impose back-up orders on that carrier until
replacement carrier found); National Small Shipments Traffic Conference v.
CAB, 618 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (ADA granted CAB broad authority to grant
tariff-filing exemptions to air cargo carriers); Shippers Nat'l Freight Claim Coun-
cil, Inc. v. United Air Lines, 15 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,439 (1978) (CAB no longer
empowered to determine reasonableness of rates; courts must apply common
law principles). For a further discussion of Shipper's National, see infra note 39.
For a further discussion of National Small Shipments, see infra note 45.
Commentators have begun to explore the effects of deregulation. See gener-
ally Callison, Airline Deregulation-Only Partially a Hoax: The Current Status of the
Airline Deregulation Movement, 45J. AIR L. & COM. 961 (1980); Dubuc, Significant
Legislative Developments in the Field of Aviation Law, 45 J. AIR L. & COM. 1, 21-34
(1979); Levine, Revisionism Revised? Airline Deregulation and the Public Interest, 44
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179 (1981); Comment, "Deregulation"--Has it Finally
Arrived? The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 44 J. AIR L. & COM. 799 (1979). For
commentary concerning the effect of deregulation on specific areas of the law,
see generally Beane, The Antitrust Implications of Airline Deregulation, 45 J. AIR L. &
COM. 1001 (1980); Cohen, New Air Service and Deregulation: A Study in Transition,
(890)
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First Pennsylvania Bank v. Eastern Airlines,3 confronted the issue of an air
carrier's ability to limit its liability for a lost shipment of air cargo after
deregulation.4 The court held that federal common law as it developed
prior to regulation of the air industry was now applicable to determine
the rights and liabilities of parties, 5 and that deregulation had had es-
sentially no effect on the substantive content of the applicable law.6
The case arose as a result of a contract between First Pennsylvania
Bank (Bank) and Eastern Airlines (Eastern) to transport checks from the
Virgin Islands to Philadelphia via Eastern's express cargo service,
SPRINT. 7 During the negotiation period, an Eastern officer informed
the Bank's Caribbean branch manager that the SPRINT service was
available only for shipments valued at $500 or less. 8 When the Bank's
branch manager notified Eastern that the checks were worth far more
than $500, the Eastern executive's only response was that the airline had
never lost any SPRINT packages. 9
The Bank used the SPRINT service to ship checks from January 31,
44J. AIR L. & COM. 695 (1979); Comment, Commuter Airlines and the Airline Deregu-
lation Act of 1978, 45J. AIR L. & CoM. 685 (1980); Comment, supra note 1; Com-
ment, Route Exit Regulation Under the Airline Deregulation Act. The Impact of Fuel Cost
and Availability, 45 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1029 (1980); Comment, Section 419 of the
Airline Deregulation Act: What has been the Effect on Air Service to Small Communities, 47
J. AIR L. & COM. 151 (1981); Note, Essential Air Transportation for Small Communi-
ties-Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 48J. AIR L. & COM. 435 (1983).
3. 731 F.2d 1113 (3d Cir. 1984).
4. Id. at 1122-23.
5. Id. at 1115-16. For a complete discussion of the court's analysis of the
applicability of federal common law, see infra notes 28-36 and accompanying
text.
6. Id. at 1122-23. The Third Circuit concluded that the most substantial
effect of deregulation was that the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) could no
longer determine the reasonableness of tariffs and that the courts were free to
directly apply federal common law principles relating to released value rates. Id.
at 1120. For a further discussion of the court's analysis of the effects of deregu-
lation in the instant case, see infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text. For a
further discussion of the effects of deregulation generally, see infra notes 37-45
and accompanying text.
7. 731 F.2d at 1114-15. Before contracting with Eastern, the Bank had em-
ployed a courier to personally deliver the checks in a pouch to Philadelphia. Id.
at 1115. The Bank, however, sought a more expedient shipping method be-
cause "[t]he sooner the checks reach[ed] the bank in Philadelphia the sooner the
large sums of money involved [could] be invested profitably." Id. at 1114-15.
Under the SPRINT service, a shipper could deliver a small package to Eastern
which would then ship it on the next flight for the destination city. Id. at 1115.
An employee of Eastern explained to the Bank's Caribbean branch manager that
the SPRINT service was faster than the courier service that the Bank was then
using. Id.
8. Id. at 1115.
9. Id. At no time did Eastern suggest that the Bank should consult the tariff
provisions to become aware of the shipping systems. Id. Also, the Third Cir-
cuit's discussion implies that Eastern never objected to the fact that the Bank
was shipping more than $500 worth of checks via the SPRINT service. Id.
1985]
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1978 throughJanuary 17, 1981.10 During this period, a published tariff
limited Eastern's liability to $500 for packages shipped through the
SPRINT service."1 Moreover, an air bill on each individual package
shipped by the Bank stated that the shipment had a declared value of
$500.12 Although Eastern had an alternative air freight service,13 at no
time did Eastern expressly inform the Bank that such an alternative
existed. 14
10. Id. The Bank used the SPRINT service for a total of 147 shipments. Id.
11. Id. A "tariff" is a "public document setting forth the services [being
offered by a] carrier ... , the rates and charges with respect to the services and
the governing rules, regulations and practices relating to those services." Inter-
national Tel. & Tel. v. United Tel. Co., 433 F. Supp. 352, 357 n.4 (M.D. Fla.
1975), aff'd, 550 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1977). The provisions of Eastern's tariff
applicable to the instant case provide:
2. It is mutually agreed that the goods described herein are ac-
cepted on the validation date hereof in apparent good order except as
noted for carriage as specified herein subject to the governing classifi-
cations and tariffs of each of the transporting carriers over their respec-
tive segments of the routing in effect on the dates of transportation and
which are filed in accordance with law. Said classifications and tariffs
are available for inspection by the parties hereto and are hereby incor-
porated into and made a part of this contract.
3. Declared value is agreed and understood to be not more than
the value stated in the governing tariffs for each pound on which
charges are assessed unless a higher value not exceeding $500 is de-
clared herein and applicable charges paid thereon.
731 F.2d at 1118 (quoting Appendix to Appellee's Brief at A-265).
Before deregulation, all air carriers were required to file tariffs with the
CAB pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act (FAA). See 49 U.S.C.A. § 1373 (1976)
(amended 1977, 1978, 1980). Since Eastern had complied with this provision
since the passage of the Act, Eastern's tariffs were on file with the CAB when the
Bank first began using the SPRINT service. 731 F.2d at 1115. However, after
the passage of the ADA, the CAB promulgated regulations providing that tariffs
no longer were required to be filed with the Board. See 14 C.F.R. § 291.31
(1978). For a further discussion of the evolution of the tariff filing exemption,
see infra note 47 and accompanying text.
Despite the filing exemption after deregulation, Eastern's tariffs were still
available in a compendium entitled Official Airline Freight Rate Tariff Book, which
was located at Dulles International Airport in Washington, D.C. 731 F.2d at
1122. Although the tariff book was available to the public and, consequently, to
the Bank, one of the central controversies of this case concerned the location
and feasibility of finding this compendium. See Brief for Appellant at 20-30,
Eastern; Brief for Appellee at 27-33, Eastern; Tape of Oral Argument, Eastern.
For a further discussion of the importance of the location of the compendium to
the instant case, see infra note 66.
12. 731 F.2d at 1115. Because of the explicit notation on the air bill limit-
ing Eastern's liability to $500 and because Eastern had informed the Bank that
the SPRINT service was only available for shipments valued at $500 or less, the
court concluded that by signing the shipping papers, the Bank knew that East-
ern's tariffs limited liability to the $500 released value. Id.
13. Id. Under Eastern's alternate air freight service, another published
tariff permitted a higher valuation for packages in exchange for a greater trans-
portation fee. Id.
14. Id. Eastern argued that it had informed the bank of its alternate serv-
ices through a notation on the air bill stating that the goods were accepted and
[Vol. 30: p. 890
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On January 17, 1981, the Bank used the SPRINT service to ship
checks, valued at more than four million dollars, which were lost and
never recovered.' 5 The Bank filed suit against Eastern in federal district
court to recover damages for the amount of the unreimbursed checks in
excess of the declared $500 limit. 16 On March 8, 1983, the district court
entered judgment in favor of the Bank for $500, enforcing the declared
valuation provision of the air bill. 17
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the holding of the lower
court. t8 The Third Circuit focused on two primary issues: (1) whether
federal common law was applicable' 9 and (2) whether deregulation had
had any effect on the applicable law. 20
Prior to Congress' entry into the field of interstate commerce, 2 1 the
law governing a common carrier's ability to limit its liability lacked uni-
formity.2 2 Under state common law and statutory principles, a carrier
shipped pursuant to "governing classifications and tariffs." Brief for Appellee at
23-24, Eastern. The district court held that this reference constituted notice of
the alternative service. First Pennsylvania Bank v. Eastern Air Lines, No. 82-
0390, Findings and Conclusions, 2-10 to 2-11 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 1983). The
Third Circuit, however, did not specifically address the issue. In its summary of
the case, the Third Circuit concluded that Eastern never informed the Bank of
any alternative, implying that it had rejected Eastern's argument. 731 F.2d at
1115. For the complete text of the applicable SPRINT tariff provisions, see supra
note 11.
15. 731 F.2d at 1115. The lost shipment, which had an aggregate value of
$4,152,080.45, contained 574 checks, including a Treasury check for
$3,787,767. Id. Apparently, a notation of the declared $500 value appeared on
the air bill for this final shipment. Id.
16. The Bank eventually recovered all but $12,932.12 of the funds repre-
sented by the lost checks. Id.
17. First Pennsylvania Bank v. Eastern Air Lines, No. 82-0390, Findings
and Conclusions, at 2-16 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 1983). The case was heard by the
Honorable Louis C. Bechtle in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. The court delivered its opinion from the bench.
18. 731 F.2d 1113 (3d Cir. 1984). The case was heard by Circuit Judges
Gibbons and Becker and Senior Judge Dumbauld of the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, who was sitting by designation.
Judge Dumbauld wrote the opinion for the unanimous court.
19. Id. at 1115. For a discussion of the applicability of federal law to con-
mon carrier liability, see infra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
20. 731 F.2d at 1119. For a discussion of the effect of deregulation on the
previously existing law, see infra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
21. Congress first entered the field of interstate commerce rate and practice
regulation in 1887 when it enacted the Interstate Commerce Act. Act of Feb. 4,
1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-11917
(1982)). Congress' primary purpose in adopting the Interstate Commerce Act
was to "impose upon railroads engaged in interstate commerce the duty of mak-
ing the charges for transportation rendered reasonable and just, and to prohibit
unjust discrimination, preferences, partiality and inequality between persons,
traffic and localities similarly situated." See M.G. ROBERTS, FEDERAL LIABILITIES
OF CARRIERS § 59, at 157 (2d ed. 1929).
22. See, e.g., Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 504-05 (1913)
(confusing early law governing common carriers created lack of uniformity of
obligation and of liability); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Hughes, 191 U.S. 447, 486
4
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was often liable for the actual value of the goods shipped. 23 Under the
federal common law, however, the "released value doctrine" developed,
permitting a limitation of the carrier's liability to the agreed upon value
of the cargo, when the agreed upon value was used to determine the
shipping rate.24 This inconsistency between state and federal principles
(1903) ("The cases are numerous and conflicting, different rules prevailing in
different States."); Southern Pac. Co. v. Crenshaw, 5 Ga. App. 675, 687, 63 S.E.
865, 870 (1909) (under same facts, carriers could be liable in one state and not
liable in another).
Commentators have reached a similar conclusion as to the lack of uniform-
ity in the law. See, e.g., M.G. ROBERTS, supra note 21, § 346, at 684 ("With such
diversity of legislative enactments and judicial holdings, neither uniformity of
obligation nor of liability existed as to interstate and foreign shipments."); Bikl6,
Agreed Valuation as Affecting the Liability of Common Carriers for Negligence, 21 HARV. L.
REV. 32, 34 (1907-08) ("[There is] much indefiniteness of principle in the re-
ported cases, and a decided lack of agreement.").
23. See, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. Hughes, 191 U.S. 477 (1903). In Hughes,
the plaintiff-shipper sued the Pennsylvania Railroad Company for damages
which his horse sustained when injured while being shipped from New York to
Pennsylvania. Id. at 478. The jury in the trial court awarded $10,000 damages
to the plaintiff, rejecting the defendant railroad's attempt to limit its liability to
$100 as stated in the contract of carriage. Id. at 479. In upholding the state
supreme court's affirmance of the trial court, the Supreme Court of the United
States recognized that under federal common law, a carrier could limit its liabil-
ity to a stated or "released" amount. Id. at 485. The Court went on to hold,
however, that since Congress had not preempted the interstate commerce field,
the public policy of a state may properly require a carrier "to use great care and
diligence in the carrying of passengers and transportation of goods, and to be
liable for the whole loss resulting from negligence in the discharge of its duties."
Id. at 491 (emphasis added). For a further discussion of a carrier's ability to limit
its liability to a released amount, see infra note 24 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court took a similar position with respect to a state statute
requiring a carrier to compensate a shipper for the full, as opposed to the re-
leased, value of shipped goods. See Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Solan, 169 U.S.
133 (1898). In Solan, the Court held that a limitation of liability clause was void
under an Iowa statute requiring that "no contract, receipt, rule or regulation
shall exempt any corporation engaged in transporting persons or property by
railway from liability of a common carrier, or carrier of passengers, which would
exist had no contract, receipt, rule or regulation been made or entered into."
Id. at 136 (quoting 1866 Iowa Acts 113). The Court, once again, acknowledged
the ability of a carrier under federal common law to limit its liability to an agreed
value but held that the state statute did not violate the United States Constitu-
tion and could properly be invoked to hold carriers liable for the full value of
lost shipments. Id. at 138. See also Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. McCann, 174 U.S.
580 (1899) (Missouri statute allowing carrier to limit liability upheld); Richmond
& A.R.R. v. R.A. Patterson Tobacco Co., 169 U.S. 311 (1898) (Virginia statute
allowing carrier to limit liability upheld).
24. See, e.g., New York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. Nothnagle, 346 U.S. 128 (1953);
Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491 (1913); Hart v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 112 U.S. 331 (1884). See also M.G. ROBERTS, supra note 21, § 346, at 684.
The released value doctrine was first articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Hart v. Pennsylvania R.R., 112 U.S. 331 (1884). In Hart, the
plaintiff shipped race horses from NewJersey to St. Louis, Missouri on defend-
ant's railroad. Id. at 331. One of the horses was killed and others were injured
en route. Id. at 334. Although the dead horse had been worth $15,000 and the
injured ones had been worth between $3000 and $3500 each and were now ren-
894
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created confusion for shippers since they could be liable, under identical
tariff provisions, for the full value of goods in one court, and for only the
agreed upon value in others. 25 Congress, however, remedied this prob-
lem when it passed the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Com-
merce Act in 1906.26 This Act specified that federal law, including the
dered worthless, the Supreme Court limited the shipper's recovery to $1200 in
accordance with the limitations contained in the contract of carriage. Id. at 343.
The Court reached this conclusion stating that it was unjust to allow "the ship-
per to be paid a large value for an article which he has induced the carrier to take
at a low rate of freight on the assertion and agreement that its value is a less sum
than that claimed after a loss." Id. at 340. The Court further explained that
"[such] contract[s] will be upheld as a proper and lawful mode of securing a due
proportion between the amount for which the carrier may be responsible and
the freight he receives, and of protecting himself against extravagant and fanci-
ful valuations." Id. at 343 (citing Squire v. New York Central R.R., 98 Mass. 239,
245 (1867)).
The Supreme Court expressly reiterated the Hart Court's approval of the
released value doctrine in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Liverpool & Great W.
Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397, 442 (1889); Primrose v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 154 U.S. 1, 15 (1893).
While courts have permitted the released value doctrine to limit liability,
they have never sanctioned complete exculpation from liability for a shipper's
negligence. See, e.g., New York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. Nothnagle, 346 U.S. 128, 135-
36 (1953) (carrier may not exonerate itself completely from liability for its negli-
gent acts); Santa Fe, P. & P. Ry. v. Grant Bros. Constr., 228 U.S. 177, 184 (1913)
("carriers cannot secure immunity from liability for their negligen[t acts]");
Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Express Co., 93 U.S. 174, 181 (1876) (well-estab-
lished that carrier cannot, by any contract with its customers, relieve himself
completely of liability for its own negligence); Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84
U.S. (17 Wall.) 357, 384 (1873) ("not just and reasonable in the eye of the law
for a common carrier to stipulate for exemption from responsibility for the neg-
ligence of himself or his servants"). The prohibition against complete exculpa-
tion from liability was specifically embodied in the Carmack Amendment to the
Interstate Commerce Act. See 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1982). For a further discus-
sion of the Carmack Amendment, see infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
25. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Crenshaw Bros., 5 Ga. App. 675, 687, 63 S.E.
865, 870 (1909). The Georgia Supreme Court commented on the confusing
state of the law:
Some states allowed carriers to exempt themselves from all or a part of
the common-law liability by rule, regulation, or contract, others did
not. The federal courts sitting in the various states were following the
local rule, a carrier being held liable in one court when under the same
state of facts he would be exempt from liability in another. Hence this
branch of interstate commerce was being subjected to such a diversity
of legislative and judicial holding that it was practically impossible for a
shipper engaged in a[n interstate] business ... to know without consid-
erable investigation and trouble, and even then oftentimes with but lit-
tle certainty what would be the carrier's actual responsibility ....
Id. For a further discussion of the confusion in the law with respect to this issue,
see supra note 22.
26. Act ofJune 29, 1906, ch. 3591, § 7, 34 Stat. 593. In its original version,
the Carmack Amendment provided, in pertinent part:
That any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company re-
ceiving property for transportation from a point in one State to a point
in another State shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor and shall
be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to
6
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released value doctrine, controlled interstate shipments. 2 7
Against this background, the Third Circuit, in First Pennsylvania Bank
v. Eastern Airlines, began its discussion of the applicability of federal com-
mon law.28 First, the court acknowledged that a significant distinction
existed between complete exculpation from liability, never sanctioned
by the common law, and liability limited to an agreed upon valuation. 29
The released value doctrine, concluded the court, allowed a carrier to
limit its liability to an agreed upon value when the shipper was given a
bona fide opportunity to declare a higher valuation in return for a
greater shipping rate.30 The court further explained that in order for
such property caused by it or by any common carrier, railroad, or trans-
portation company to which such property may be delivered, or over
whose line or lines such property may pass, and no contract, receipt,
rule, or regulation shall exempt such common carrier, railroad, or
transportation company from the liability hereby imposed: Provided,
That nothing in this section shall deprive any holder of such receipt or
bill of. lading of any remedy or right of action which he has under ex-
isting law.
Id. For a discussion of the purpose behind the passage of the Carmack Amend-
ment, see generally M.G. ROBERTS, supra note 21, §§ 66-67, at 168-74.
27. See Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 510 (1913). Imme-
diately following the passage of the Carmack Amendment, courts and commen-
tators believed that the remedy saving clause of the amendment was designed to
preserve the various and divergent rights that shippers had under state statutes
and common law. See, e.g., Donlon Bros. v. Southern Pac. Co., 151 Cal. 763, 91
P. 603 (1907); Cutter v. Wells Fargo & Co., 237 Ill. 247, 86 N.E. 695 (1908);
Miller v. Chicago, B. & Q Ry., 85 Neb. 458, 123 N.W. 449 (1909), rev'd, 226 U.S.
513 (1913); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Harriman Bros., 128 S.W. 932 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1910), rev'd, 227 U.S. 657 (1913); Goddard, The Liability of the Common Car-
rier as Determined by Recent Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 15 CoL. L.
REV. 475, 476-77 (1915); Sanford, The Carmack Amendment in the State Courts, 15
MIcH. L. REV. 314 (1917). However, in Adams Express, the Supreme Court held
that the Carmack Amendment was intended to save only such rights previously
existing under federal common law. 226 U.S. at 507. After determining that the
shipper was aware of alternate rates and services, thereby allowing the railroad
to limit its liability as stated in the bill of lading, the Supreme Court specifically
held that the Carmack Amendment had superseded all state policies and regula-
tions dealing with liability limitations, because of its general character. Id. at
505. The Court wrote:
To construe this proviso as preserving to the holder of any such bill of
lading any right or remedy which he may have had under existing Fed-
eral law at the time of his action, gives to [the remedy saving clause] a
more rational interpretation than one which would preserve rights and
remedies under existing state laws, for the latter view would cause the
proviso to destroy the act itself.
Id. at 507-08. The Court went on to explain that the released value doctrine was
one such preserved federal common law right. Id. at 509-10. Accord Boston &
M.R.R. v. Piper, 246 U.S. 439, 444 (1918); Kansas City S. Ry. v. Carl, 227 U.S.
639, 648-49 (1913).
28. 731 F.2d at 1115.
29. Id. at 1116. For a further discussion of the common law distinction be-
tween complete exculpation from liability and the released value doctrine, see
supra note 24 and accompanying text.
30. 731 F.2d at 1117 (citing New York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. Nothnagle, 346
896
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the opportunity to be "bona fide," the shipper must be given notice of
the availability of alternate rates for differing degrees of protection. 3 1
The Third Circuit then recognized the continued vitality of a notice rule
first articulated over seventy years ago in Kansas City Southern Railway v.
Carl.3 2 In Carl, the court stated in dicta that shippers are charged with
constructive notice of duly filed tariffs when carriers are required to file
their rate tariff schedules with a regulatory agency.
33
U.S. 128 (1953); Union Pac. R.R. v. Burke, 255 U.S. 317 (1921)). In Nothnagle,
although a filed tariff limited the railroad's liability to $500, the Supreme Court
held that a carrier could not take advantage of the limited liability tariff when no
value was agreed to in writing. 346 U.S. at 135. The Supreme Court stated:
"[O]nly by granting its customers a fair opportunity to choose between higher
or lower liability by paying a correspondingly greater or lesser charge can a car-
rier lawfully limit recovery to an amount less than the actual loss sustained." Id.
at 135.
In Burke, after cargo was destroyed en route from San Francisco to New
York, the railroad attempted to limit its liability to the amount stated on the
shipping bill. 255 U.S. at 318. Because the shipper was not given a bona fide
option of declaring a higher amount, the railroad company was required to pay
for the full value of the goods. Id. at 323. The Burke Court explained:
Having but one applicable published rate east of San Francisco the pe-
titioner did not give, and could not lawfully have given, the shipper a
choice of rates, and therefore the stipulation of value in the ... bill of
lading, ... cannot bring the case within the valuation exception, [e.g.,
where the shipper is given a choice of declaring one of several rates]
and the carrier's liability must be determined by the rules of the com-
mon law.
Id.
31. 731 F.2d at 1117 (citing Klicker v. Northwest Airlines, 563 F.2d 1310
(9th Cir. 1977)). In Klicker, the plaintiff shipped a valuable golden retriever that
died during an interstate flight. 563 F.2d at 1311-12. The Ninth Circuit did not
allow the airline to limit its liability because, after being informed of the dog's
value, the airline did not inform the shipper that there were alternate services
available with greater protection. Id. at 1316. The court stated: "[Tihe released
valuation limitations bind the passenger-shipper to the restriction on liability,
however, only if he has notice of the rate structure and is given the opportunity
to pay the higher rate in order to obtain greater protection." Id. at 1315. See also
Nothnagle, 346 U.S. at 135-36 ("[b]inding [shipper] by a limitation which she had
no reasonable opportunity to discover would effectively deprive her of the requi-
site choice") (footnote omitted).
32. 731 F.2d at 1116-17 (citing Kansas City S. Ry. v. Carl, 227 U.S. 639
(1913)).
33. Carl, 227 U.S. at 653. In Carl, the plaintiff shipped several boxes of
household goods on defendant's railroad. Id. at 640. One box was never deliv-
ered and the shipper sued for the full value, despite the existence of a liability
limiting clause on the bill of lading. Id. After explaining that the Carmack
Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Adams Express, was applica-
ble, the Court stated:
Where there are two published rates, based upon difference in value,
the legal rate automatically attaches itself to the declared or agreed
value .... The shipper's knowledge of the lawful rate is conclusively
presumed, and the carrier may not be required to surrender the goods
carried upon the payment of the rate paid, if that was less than the law-
ful rate, until the full legal rate has been paid.
227 U.S. at 652-53. See also Pierce Co. v. Wells, Fargo & Co.. 236 U.S. 278, 285
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol30/iss3/8
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30: p. 890
The Third Circuit then cited with approval Universal Computer System
v. Allegheny Airlines,34 in which the District Court for the Middle District
of Pennsylvania upheld a liability limitation by relying upon the released
value doctrine. 3 5 The Third Circuit concluded that because the tariff
provisions in Allegheny were identical to those in question in Eastern, Alle-
gheny was "strong precedent" for affirming the case at bar.
36
Deregulation of the airline industry began with the Air Cargo De-
regulation Act of 1977 (ACDA). 37 The ACDA eliminated the Civil Aer-
(1915) (filed tariffs give shippers opportunity to have recovery in a greater value
upon paying a higher rate); Boston & M. R.R. v. Hooker, 233 U.S. 97, 113
(1914) ("if it be found that the limitation of liability for baggage is required to be
filed in the carrier's tariffs, the [shipper is] bound by such limitation"); Texas &
Pac. Ry. v. Mugg, 202 U.S. 242, 245 (1906) (even where shipper agrees to pay
lesser rate than that established in filed tariffs, filed tariffs are applicable and
shipper must pay full amount).
34. 731 F.2d at 1117 (citing Universal Computer Sys. v. Allegheny Airlines,
479 F. Supp. 639 (M.D. Pa. 1979), aft'd, mem., 622 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1980)).
35. 479 F. Supp. at 643. In Allegheny, the plaintiff, Universal Computer
Services (Universal), prepared a bid for the lease of a computer in response to
Blue Shield's solicitation. Id. at 640. Universal contacted an employee at Blue
Shield who agreed to pick up the bid at Allegheny Airlines' (Allegheny) ticket
counter and to deliver it in time to meet the submission deadline. Id. The bid
was sent through Allegheny's PDQexpress air courier service. Id. As a result of
a misunderstanding on the part of Allegheny as to who was to pick up the bid,
Universal was not able to submit it until after the deadline had lapsed. Id.
Universal sued in tort on the grounds of conversion and wrongful interfer-
ence with its property. Id. Allegheny claimed that its applicable filed tariff pro-
visions provided that the airline could not be held liable for the tort damages in
excess of the valuation limitation provision. Id. In upholding the liability limit-
ing clause in this prederegulation case, the district court explained:
[Universal] never could have had an expectation of recovering more
than the $500 [upper] valuation limit on items shipped in this manner
[pursuant to the terms of the Small Package Airbill]. Because it did not
take the opportunity to pay for greater liability coverage by declaring a
higher value the shipment had a $50 [lowest possible] declared value
pursuant to the tariff. The rates are set considering the risk assumed
.... The $50 limitation would apply to all liability including any claim
for consequential or special damages.
Id. at 643 (citations omitted).
36. 731 F.2d at 1119 (citing Universal Computer Sys. v. Allegheny Airlines,
479 F. Supp. 639). For a description of the provisions in effect in Eastern, see
supra note 11.
37. Pub. L. No. 95-163, 91 Stat. 1278-89 (1977) (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1982)). The essential goal of the act was to promote
"[t]he encouragement and development of an integrated transportation system
relying upon competitive market forces to determine the extent, variety, quality
and price of [all cargo air] services." 49 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (1982).
The ACDA pertained exclusively to air carriers providing all-cargo air ser-
vice. See Pub. L. No. 95-163, 91 Stat. 1278-89, 1284 (1977) (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1982)). As defined by the ACDA, "All-
cargo air service" refers to the carriage of property or mail exclusively. 49
U.S.C. § 1301(11) (1982). Thus, the ACDA had no deregulatory effect upon air
carriers transporting both cargo and passengers. See generally National Small
Shipments Traffic Conference v. CAB, 618 F.2d 819, 823-24 n.5 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Liability and Claim Rules and Practices, C.A.B. Order 78-7-100, 77
898
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onautics Board's 38 (CAB or Board) primary jurisdiction to determine
the reasonableness of a cargo carrier's rates and practices, 39 and also
facilitated a cargo carrier's ability to obtain exemptions from various
provisions of the Federal Aviation Act. 40 One year later, Congress con-
C.A.B. 763, 765 (July 21, 1978). But cf. ADA, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705-
54 (1978) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1982)). For a fur-
ther discussion of the air carriers affected by the ADA, see infra note 41.
38. The predecessor to the CAB, the Civil Aeronautics Authority, was cre-
ated by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 with authority to regulate both safety
and economic aspects of the airline industry. See Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,
Pub. L. No. 706, § 201, 52 Stat. 973, 980-81 (amended 1958). The Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, despite changing the name of the Civil Aeronautics Au-
thority to the Civil Aeronautics Board, kept economic regulatory power in the
CAB. See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, §§ 201-205, 72 Stat.
731, 741-44 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1325 (1982)). Safety
regulation, however, was transferred to a newly created Federal Aviation Au-
thority. Id. §§ 301-304, 72 Stat. at 744-49 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1341-1345 (1982)).
39. See Comment, supra note 1, at 124-27. The CAB's primary jurisdiction
originated from § 1382 of the Federal Aviation Act, which granted the Board the
authority to reject and alter tariffs that were challenged as "unjust or unreasona-
ble, or unjustly discriminatory, or unduly preferential, or unduly prejudicial."
49 U.S.C.A. § 1482(d) (1976), amended by ACDA, Pub. L. No. 95-163, § 18(a), 91
Stat. 1286-87 (1977). As a result of this section, any claim as to the reasonable-
ness of a tariff was properly before the Board in the first instance. See Lichten v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1951). Under this doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, any tariff duly filed was considered valid until rejected by
the CAB. See Mack v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 113, 115 (D. Mass.
1949); Comment, supra note 1, at 114-15. Therefore, when the industry was
regulated, courts had no power to determine the reasonableness of an air car-
rier's rates, tariffs and practices. Pratt, Tariff Limitations on Air Carriage Contracts,
29J. AIR L. & COM. 14 (1963).
The ACDA substantially altered the CAB's authority with respect to the reg-
ulation of rates. The amended § 1482(d) no longer includes "unreasonable-
ness" as a grounds for the CAB to alter a rate or practice. See 49 U.S.C.
§ 1482(d)(3) (1982). The Board's authority over tariffs was limited to cases in
which a rate or practice was challenged as "unjustly discriminatory, or unduly
preferential, or unduly prejudicial, or predatory." Id. This change in the CAB's
authority has been interpreted to deprive the Board of primary jurisdiction. See
Shipper's Nat'l Freight Claim Council, Inc. v. United Air Lines, 15 Av. Cas.
(CCH) 17,439 (D.D.C. 1978). In Shipper's National, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia held that the primary jurisdiction doctrine
had essentially been eliminated by deregulation and that the district court was
the proper forum for the case. Id. at 17,440. With respect to the judiciary's
new-found authority, the court declared that it now had the power to directly
apply common law liability rules. Id. at 17,441. For a further discussion of the
Third Circuit's treatment of the primary jurisdiction issue, see infra notes 48-50
and accompanying text.
40. The ACDA facilitated a cargo carrier's ability to be exempt from provi-
sions of the Federal Aviation Act by setting up a new certification procedure for
all-cargo air carriers. See 49 U.S.C. § 1388 (1982). Prior to the enactment of the
ACDA, any air carrier wishing to service a new route was required to obtain a
§ 1371 certificate from the CAB stating that the proposed service was for "the
public convenience and necessity." 49 U.S.C.A. § 1371(a) (1976), amended by
ACDA, Pub. L. No. 95-163, § 11, 91 Stat. 1284-86 (1977). The ACDA, however,
set up a dichotomy between all-cargo air carriers, operating under the new
10
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tinued the dismantling process by passing the Airline Deregulation Act
of 1978 (ADA). 4 1 Specifically, the ADA called for a cessation of the
CAB's authority to determine rates and practices of all air carriers by
January 1, 1983,42 and for a complete abolition of the Board by January
1, 1985.4 3 To allow more independence to all air carriers, as opposed to
only cargo carriers, Congress further broadened the CAB's power to ex-
empt air carriers from any provision of the Federal Aviation Act.44 Pur-
suant to the exemption authority given the CAB under the two
deregulation acts, the Board, on November 8, 1978, promulgated regu-
lations exempting from the tariff filing provision all air carriers of
property.4 5
§ 1388 certificates, and all other air carriers operating under the § 1371 "public
convenience and necessity" certificates. Compare 49 U.S.C.A. § 1371 (1976),
amended by ACDA, Pub. L. No. 95-163, § 9, 91 Stat. 1281 & 1284-86 (1977) with
49 U.S.C. § 1388 (1982). The ACDA specifically provided that cargo carriers
holding § 1388 certificates were exempt from the § 1371 "public convenience
and necessity" certification procedure, and that the Board could also exempt
such carriers from any other provisions of the Federal Aviation Act. 49 U.S.C.
§ 1388(c) (1982). Pursuant to this new lenient exemption section, the CAB ex-
empted all-cargo air carriers from the tariff-filing provisions of the Federal Avia-
tion Act. 14 C.F.R. § 291.31 (1978). See also National Small Shipments Traffic
Conference v. CAB, 618 F.2d 819, 827-31 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (discussion of CAB's
authority to grant exemptions to tariff filing requirements).
41. Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705-54 (1978) (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1982)). In contrast to the ACDA, the ADA pertained to
all air carriers generally and not merely air-cargo carriers. Id. For a further
discussion of the scope of the ACDA, see supra note 37.
42. 49 U.S.C. § 1551(a)(2) (1982). For a discussion of how the ACDA
changed the CAB's authority to determine the reasonableness of an air-cargo
carrier's rates and practices, see supra note 39.
43. 49 U.S.C. § 1551 (a)(3) (1982). See generally N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1985, at
A20, col. 1; Dallos, Once-Powerful CAB Gets Set to Self-Destruct, L.A. Times, Dec. 23,
1984, § 5, at 1, col. 2.
44. 49 U.S.C. § 1386(b) (1982). After the ADA, an air carrier could be ex-
empted from any provision of the Federal Aviation Act so long as it was "consis-
tent with the public interest." Id. Under the ACDA, any cargo carrier operating
under a § 1388 certificate could be exempted from any provision of the Federal
Aviation Act which the Board determined to be "appropriate." Id. § 1388(c).
For a further discussion of the exemption authority granted by the ACDA, see
supra note 40.
45. 14 C.F.R. § 291.31 (1978). The Board used its new-found authority
granted by the ACDA and the ADA to enact these exemptions. See 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1386(b), 1388(c) (1982). The ACDA had specifically granted the authority to
exempt all-cargo carriers operating under the new § 1388 certificates. 49 U.S.C.
§ 1388(c) (1982). Since most of the nation's freight is moved by carriers provid-
ing combination service (i.e. both passenger and cargo) acting under § 1371 (a)
"public convenience and necessity" certificates, the Board used its new
§ 1386(b) authority granted by the ADA to exempt the "combination" air carri-
ers of property. See National Small Shipments, 618 F.2d at 824 n.5; Liability and
Claim Rules and Practices, C.A.B. Order 78-7-100, 77 C.A.B., 763, 765 (July 21,
1978) ("It would be anomalous to create different liability systems depending on
whether cargo is carried on all-cargo plane or on a combination plane."); Gen-
eral Rules for All-Cargo Carriers, 43 Fed. Reg. 53628 (1978) (exemption applies
to all carriers providing domestic air cargo transportation).
900 [Vol. 30: p. 890
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The Third Circuit began the second part of its analysis by assessing
the impact of deregulation on existing law.4 6 According to the court,
deregulation of the air industry had had essentially two effects pertinent
to the case at bar: first, it eliminated the obligation imposed on all air
carriers of property to file tariffs with the CAB and to adhere to them;4 7
second, it eliminated the Board's primary jurisdiction in assessing the
reasonableness of freight rates and tariffs. 4 8 Consequently, reasoned
the Third Circuit, the courts were left to directly apply the common law
when confronted with the reasonableness issue. 49 Thus, the Third Cir-
cuit concluded that deregulation of the airline industry had had no effect
on the substantive aspects of the released value doctrine but had merely
changed the forum in which the reasonableness of an air carrier's rates
would be determined. 50
After concluding that the released value doctrine would apply to the
instant case despite deregulation, the court addressed the merits of the
case. 5 1 The court held that because the Bank had begun using the
SPRINT service while Eastern was still subject to CAB regulation, the
Bank would be charged with constructive notice of the available alterna-
tive tariffs for air cargo transport.5 2 Consequently, under the released
These tariff-filing exemptions, promulgated by the CAB, were upheld by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in National Small Ship-
ments Traffic Conference v. CAB, 618 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The court in
National Small Shipments held that the CAB's authority under new § 1386(b) and
§ 1388 granted the Board broad discretion to issue exemptions to the Federal
Aviation Act and that, consequently, the regulations promulgated by the Board
were not arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 827-31.
46. 731 F.2d at 1119-22.
47. Id. at 1120. For a further discussion of the evolution of this exemption,
see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
48. 731 F.2d at 1120. In concluding that the Board's primary jurisdiction
had been eliminated, the court examined the regulatory scheme before and after
deregulation. Id. The court explained that because the CAB's authority to in-
validate tariffs was now limited to situations in which it found the tariffs unduly
discriminatory, preferential or predatory, the proper forum in which to deter-
mine the reasonableness of a cargo carrier's tariffs was the court. Id. at 1122.
For a further discussion of the change in the CAB's authority, see supra notes 39-
40 & 44 and accompanying text.
49. 731 F.2d at 1122 (citing Liability and Claim Rules and Practices, C.A.B.
order 78-7-100, 77 C.A.B. 763, 765 (July 21, 1978)). For a further exposition of
the effect of deregulation on primary jurisdiction, see supra note 39 and accom-
panying text.
50. 731 F.2d at 1122. The court stated: "After deregulation, the validity of
the agreed value provision in Eastern's . . . tariff ... became a purely judicial
question for determination by application of the federal common law patterned
upon the policy of the Carmack Amendment." Id. For a further discussion of
the released value doctrine, see supra note 24 and accompanying text. For a
further discussion of the Carmack Amendment, see supra notes 26-27 and ac-
companying text.
51. 731 F.2d at 1122.
52. Id. The court reasoned that because the Bank had constructive notice
of the tariff provisions and the shipping documents on its first shipment in Janu-
1985]
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value doctrine, the Third Circuit found that Eastern could properly limit
its liability for the lost checks to $500. 5 3 However, the court specifically
declined to decide whether shippers entering into contracts with air car-
riers subsequent to deregulation would have constructive notice of the
tariffs listed in the Official Airline Freight Rate Tariff Book. 54
In reviewing the court's opinion in Eastern, it is submitted that the
Third Circuit properly found federal common law applicable to the in-
stant case.5 5 In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit responded in
a manner consistent with earlier CAB speculation 5 6 and a recent federal
district court decision concerning liability limitations. 5 7
In its application of the federal common law principle of the re-
leased value doctrine, 5 8 however, the Third Circuit pushed the notion of
constructive notice to its limits. 59 The court imputed constructive no-
tice to the Bank despite the fact that Eastern's tariffs were no longer on
ary, 1978, the Bank should be imputed with knowledge of these provisions on all
subsequent shipments because they were made in accordance with the same pro-
cedure. Id. For a further discussion of the constructive notice principle, see
supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
53. 731 F.2d at 1122. The court noted:
As sophisticated men of affairs, appellant's officers knew that there
was substantial risk arising from the discrepancy when the shipments
had an actual value of millions of dollars and the carrier disclaimed in
writing any liability in excess of $500. They made a business judgment
when they decided not to explore the possibility of obtaining greater
protection from the airline at a higher rate, or even of taking out a
policy themselves with an insurance company to cover their exposure.
Having made their bed they must lie in it. We are not at liberty to
"second guess" their cost-benefit analysis.
Id.
54. Id. at 1123. The court wrote: "We express no opinion as to whether
the current practice of referencing schedules located in the 'Official Airline
Freight Rate Tariff Book' would be sufficient to inform a shipper of the availabil-
ity of alternative services providing for full loss liability coverage." Id.
55. See id. at 1122. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's discussion
of the applicability of federal common law to the instant case, see supra notes 28-
36 and accompanying text.
56. Liability and Claim Rules and Practices, C.A.B. Order 78-7-100, 77
C.A.B. 763, 766 (July 21, 1978) (citing Klicker, 563 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1977))
(CAB implicitly approved of post-deregulation application of federal common
law). See also Brief for Appellee at 13-18, Eastern.
57. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Barnes Elec. Co., 540 F. Supp. 640, 645
(N.D. Ind. 1982) (citing Nothnagle, 346 U.S. 128 (1953)). Fireman's Fund involved
the validity of a liability limiting clause after deregulation. 540 F. Supp. at 641.
In Fireman's Fund, United Air Lines was charged with failing to complete the
delivery of shipments of the plaintiff's art works. Id. In considering the choice
of law issue with respect to the validity of United's liability limiting clause, the
court held that "questions concerning the validity of tariffs or contracts limiting
liability of carriers engaged in interstate transportation are to be determined in
accordance withfederal law." Id. at 645 (emphasis added).
58. 731 F.2d at 1115-19. For a further discussion of the court's analysis of
the released value doctrine, see supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
59. 731 F.2d at 1122-23. For a further discussion of the court's application
of the constructive notice principle to the instant case, see supra notes 52-53 and
902
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file with the CAB at the time the shipment in question occurred. 60 The
court reasoned that the constructive notice principle should be applied
because tariffs were on file when the first shipment was made, and all
subsequent shipments were made in accordance with the same proce-
dure.6 1 It is submitted that the Third Circuit, while purporting to use
the constructive notice principle as developed in the Carl case,6 2 instead
balanced the equities to come to the conclusion that the Bank could not
recover the full amount of its loss. In its opinion, the Third Circuit was
aware of several equitable considerations: the Bank was a large banking
concern which made an informed business decision to ship checks of
great value through an inexpensive air carrier service; 63 it had numerous
opportunities to examine the tariff provisions;6 4 and it was aware of the
limited liability provision in each air bill from the beginning of its con-
tractual relationship with Eastern.6 5 In acknowledging these factors, the
Third Circuit manifested a desire to reach the proper equitable result,
and used the constructive notice principle as a means by which to reach
this conclusion. 66
accompanying text. For a general discussion of the constructive notice princi-
ple, see supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
60. See 731 F.2d at 1122.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 1116-17 (citing Kansas City S. Ry. v. Carl, 227 U.S. 639
(1913)). For a discussion of the Carl case, see supra notes 32-33 and accompany-
ing text.
63. See 731 F.2d at 1122. The Third Circuit specifically noted that the deci-
sion to use the SPRINT service was not consistent with the Bank's relative size
and implicit business acumen. Id. For the text of the court's opinion concerning
the Bank's business judgment, see supra note 53.
64. See 731 F.2d at 1115. The court noted that the Bank used the SPRINT
service 147 times before the shipment in question. Id.
65. See id. For a discussion of the court's findings with respect to the Bank's
knowledge of the alternate tariffs, see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
These factors, along with the fact that the Bank would have had constructive
notice of alternate services under Carl at the beginning of its business relation-
ship with Eastern, support the conclusion that it would have been inequitable to
allow the Bank to recover any more than the stated value as it appeared on each
air bill.
66. 731 F.2d at 1115-19, 1122. The court's difficulty in applying the strict
principle of the Carl case is also exemplified by its failure to address the issue of
whether publication of alternate tariffs in the Official Airline Freight Rate Tariff Book
would constitute sufficient notice to shippers. 731 F.2d at 1123. Although the
Third Circuit specifically declined to address the issue, the briefs and tape of the
oral argument suggest that the parties considered the location and availability of
the tariff provisions to be a major controversy in the case. Brief for Appellant at
29-30, Eastern; Brief for Appellee at 27-44, Eastern. The Bank argued that it was
unaware of the alternative rates, despite language on the reverse side of the
contract concerning alternate services. Brief for Appellant at 24-30, Eastern.
Moreover, at oral argument, the Bank argued that it was unable to locate this
compendium in preparation for trial. Tape of oral argument, Eastern. The Bank
also argued that if the compendium exists, a shipper should not be expected to
take extreme measures to find it, particularly because the compendium's loca-
tion at Dulles International Airport is not central. Id.
1985]
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Although the Third Circuit may have reached the proper, equitable
conclusion on these facts, the court's strained application of the con-
structive notice doctrine suggests that some of the old federal common
law cases relied on by the court may no longer have continued vitality in
the deregulated air industry context. 6 7 The federal common law cases
upon which the Third Circuit relied were decided almost a century ago
in the context of the regulated railroad industry. 68 When the airline in-
dustry was regulated, 69 these cases were consistently invoked for their
general principles in assessing a carrier's liability for lost shipments. 70
It is submitted that this reliance was proper during airline regulation
since both airlines and railroad companies were subject to similar statu-
tory schemes which attempted to provide uniformity of rates and prac-
tices, and equality to all shippers. 7 1 When the airline industry was
Eastern, conversely, argued that the publication of tariffs in the' Official Air-
line Freight Rate Tariff Book was adequate notice and that Dulles International Air-
port was a central location for the compendium. Brief for Appellee at 27-33,
Eastern; Tape of Oral Argument, Eastern.
67. For a discussion of the court's use of the old federal common law cases,
see supra notes 28-36 & 51-54 and accompanying text.
68. See Burke, 255 U.S. 317 (1921); Carl, 227 U.S. 639 (1913);Adams Express,
226 U.S. 491 (1913); Hart, 112 U.S. 331 (1884). For a further discussion of
Burke, see supra note 30. For a further discussion of Carl, see supra notes 32-33.
For a further discussion of Adams Express, see supra note 27. For a further discus-
sion of Hart, see supra note 24.
69. The airline industry was regulated from 1938 until 1977. See Civil Aer-
onautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 605, 52 Stat. 973 (1938) (setting up regulatory
scheme), amended by Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat.
731 (1958); ACDA, Pub. L. No. 95-163, 91 Stat. 1278-89 (1977) (first deregula-
tion act); ADA, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 94 Stat. 1705-52 (1978) (second deregula-
tion act).
70. See, e.g., Klicker, 562 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing Burke, 255 U.S.
317 (1921); Piper, 246 U.S. 439 (1918)); Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, 189 F.2d
939 (2d Cir. 1951) (citing Adams Express, 226 U.S. 491 (1913)); Mustard v. East-
ern Air Lines, 338 Mass. 674, 156 N.E.2d 696 (1959) (citing Carl, 227 U.S. 639
(1913); Adams Express, 226 U.S. 491 (1913); Hart, 112 U.S. 331 (1884)).
71. Compare 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-11917 (1982) (Interstate Commerce Act)
with 49 U.S.C.A. § 1301-1552 (1976) (Federal Aviation Act) (amended 1977-
1982). The essential purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act was to assure
equality to all shippers in interstate commerce and to prevent unjust discrimina-
tion, preferences, partiality and inequality between shippers and carriers. See
United States v. Union Stock Yard & Transit Co., 226 U.S. 286 (1912); Armour
Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56 (1908); New York, N.H. & H.R.R. v.
ICC, 200 U.S. 361 (1906); American Silver Mfg. Co. v. Wabash R. Co., 174 Mo.
App. 184, 196-97, 156 S.W. 830, 834 (1913); M.G. ROBERTS, supra note 21, § 59,
at 157.
Similarly, the Federal Aviation Act attempted to "promot[e] . . . adequate,
economical, and efficient service by air carriers at reasonable charges, without
unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destruc-
tive competitive practices." 49 U.S.C.A. § 1302(c) (1976), repealed by Pub. L. No.
96-192, § 3(a), 94 Stat. 36 (1980). See also Transcontinental Bus Sys. v. CAB,
383 F.2d 466, 477 (5th Cir. 1967) (power-granting sections of Federal Aviation
Act infuse a "rule of equality" into the regulatory policy controlling rates in air
industry), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1967).
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deregulated, however, this similarity between the two industries
ended. 72 It is submitted that since this parallelism no longer exists, fu-
ture courts will be forced to examine whether the principles for which
the old federal common law cases stand are still applicable. In making
this examination, it is submitted that courts will continue to rely on the
released value doctrine generally but will not readily apply the construc-
tive notice principle.
The released value doctrine developed before the railroad industry
was regulated 73 and has been recognized as being beneficial to both
shippers and carriers.7 4 As a result, it is submitted that the released
value doctrine will be given continued vitality. The constructive notice
principle, however, which is inextricably tied to the regulatory scheme,
originally developed to further Congress' goal of achieving uniformity
of rates. 75 Since there is no longer an artificial uniform rate structure in
the airline industry and tariffs no longer must be filed with the CAB,
7 6
the reasons for conclusively presuming a shipper's knowledge of alter-
72. The purpose behind the deregulation acts was to allow market forces,
as opposed to the artificial uniformity of regulation, to determine rates and prac-
tices. 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982). See also 123 Cong. Rec. 34,663 (1977) (remarks
of Sen. Cannon) (market forces can adequately determine the cost of all-cargo
transportation).
73. The released value doctrine was first comprehensively articulated in
Hart v. Pennsylvania R.R., 112 U.S. 331 (1984). For a further discussion of the
Hart case and the development of the released value doctrine, see supra note 24
and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Hart v. Pennsylvania R.R., 112 U.S. 331 (1884). As stated by
the Supreme Court in Hart:
The effect of the agreements is to cheapen the freight and secure the
carriage, if there is no loss; and the effect of disregarding the agree-
ment, after a loss, is to expose the carrier to a greater risk than the
parties intended he should assume. . . . The limitation as to value has
no tendency to exempt from liability for negligence. It does not induce
want of care. It exacts from the carrier the measure of care due to the
value agreed on.
112 U.S. at 340. See also Adams Express, 226 U.S. at 509 ("The inherent right to
receive a compensation commensurate with the risk involved the right to protect
[the carrier] from fraud and imposition by reasonable rules and regulations, and
the right to agree upon a rate proportionate to the value of the property
transported.").
75. See Boston & M.R.R. v. Hooker, 233 U.S. 97 (1914); Kansas City S. Ry.
v. Carl, 227 U.S. 639 (1913); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Cisco Oil Mill, 204 U.S. 449
(1907); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Mugg, 202 U.S. 242 (1906). The Hooker Court stated
that "the effect of filing schedules of rates with the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission was to make the published rates binding upon shipper and carrier alike,
thus making effectual the purpose of the act to have but one rate, open to all
alike and from which there could be no departure." 233 U.S. at 112. The Court
in Hooker, although without referring to the specific designation "constructive
notice," went on to hold that a shipper's knowledge of rates will be conclusively
presumed if the tariffs are filed. Id. at 119. For a further discussion of the con-
structive notice principle, see supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
76. For a further discussion of the tariff filing exemption, see supra notes 45
& 47 and accompanying text.
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nate filed tariffs may no longer exist. 77 Thus, it is submitted that future
courts will not impute to shippers knowledge of alternate rates even if
such rates appear in a commercially published compendium as in the
instant case.
7 8
Thus, the Third Circuit's opinion has three significant implications
for practitioners. First, since the precise holding of the court is quite
narrow and factually specific, 79 its potential application to future cases is
limited. As the years since airline regulation increase, it is unlikely that
many shippers will fit into the same contractual positions as did Eastern
and the Bank. Consequently, the court's narrow holding will be inappo-
site for most shippers and carriers.
Second, although many of the federal common law cases relied on
by the court were decided almost a century ago in the context of railroad
travel, practitioners should be aware that until a significant body of case
law develops, these old cases, by necessity, will be given renewed vitality
by courts in the Third Circuit.
80
77. Since tariffs no longer must be filed with the CAB, it is submitted that
fairness principles dictate that shippers should not be deemed to have construc-
tive notice of such tariffs. The CAB was centrally located and all shippers were
aware that tariffs were filed with it. Charging shippers with constructive notice
of tariffs filed in the central location led to a system of uniform rates and prac-
tices. 46 Fed. Reg. 35,937 (July 13, 1981). Since the deregulatory scheme con-
templates the elimination of the artificial uniformity provided by filing and
subjecting tariffs to CAB scrutiny, it is submitted that the underlying purpose of
constructive notice has been eliminated. This position was specifically antici-
pated by the CAB in its notice of proposed rules concerning the elimination of
tariff filing requirements for passenger carriers. 46 Fed. Reg. 35,936 (July 13,
1981). The CAB stated: "The carriers would have responsibility to communi-
cate the terms of their contract of carriage, without the constructive notice that
has up to now been afforded by tariff filing. The reasonableness of the terms
and the adequacy of notice to the passengers would be subject to court review."
Id. at 35,937.
78. The record in the instant case shows that Eastern referenced on each air
bill the tariffs applicable for each shipment. 731 F.2d at 1123. These tariffs
were published in a commercial compendium which presumably listed the alter-
nate services provided by Eastern. Id. If such a compendium were available at
the shipping desk or in the originating and/or destination city, it is submitted
that the inference of constructive notice may attach. When the compendium is
located in an arbitrary and inconvenient location, however, as in the instant case,
adherence to the constructive notice doctrine would be inequitable and illogical.
Since there also is no longer a desire for artificial uniformity of rates, submission
of tariffs to any such compendium would be purely voluntary. Moreover, be-
cause the compendium is privately published, there would be no guarantee of its
accuracy or completeness. Given these potential deficiencies with a private com-
pendium, it would be unreasonable to impute knowledge to a shipper. For a
further discussion of the importance of this compendium to the instant case, see
supra note 66. For a further discussion of the constructive notice principle, see
supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
79. The narrowness of the decision results from the fact that the shipping
contract was entered into prior to deregulation and the shipment was lost after
deregulation. See 731 F.2d at 1115.
80. It is submitted that a significant body of case law will develop quickly as
a result of the demise of the primary jurisdiction doctrine in this area. Courts
906 [Vol. 30: p. 890
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Finally, in light of the Third Circuit's manipulation of the construc-
tive notice principle, 8 1 the doctrine's fate remains uncertain. Until the
Third Circuit addresses this issue more comprehensively, however, ship-
pers should be advised to protect themselves before entering a contrac-
tual relationship with an air carrier by inquiring into the alternative rates
and services. Carriers, conversely, must be advised to examine new
methods of informing their customers of alternate rates and services in
order to take advantage of the released value doctrine. 82 Only in this
way may both shippers and carriers be adequately protected, while
courts struggle to determine whether or not constructive notice will con-
tinue to be applied.
Bruce G. Leto
now will be forced to hear cases in the first instance which, under regulation,
they would only have heard after an initial CAB disposition. For a further dis-
cussion of the applicability of federal common law to the instant case, see supra
notes 21-36 & 55-61 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the
primary jurisdiction doctrine, see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
81. For a further discussion of the court's manipulation of the constructive
notice principle, see supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
82. The linchpin of the released value doctrine is that the shipper be given
notice of alternate freight rates for which he can obtain differing degrees of pro-
tection depending on the rate, and that the shipper be given the opportunity to
make an informed choice. For a further discussion of the released value doc-
trine, see supra note 24 and accompanying text. Since there is no longer a cen-
tral agency with which to file tariffs, air carriers apparently must devise a means
by which to give notice to shippers of various alternate services and rates.
One commentator has suggested that as a result of the elimination of the
CAB, the released value doctrine will apply only if carriers give notice to ship-
pers by listing on tickets or air bills the information that was previously set forth
in the filed tariffs. Comment, supra note 1, at 128. The commentator concludes
that as a result of the added burden on carriers to give actual notice to shippers,
ticketing, boarding and shipping practices will become much more complicated
and expensive. Id. at 147.
It is submitted that such reasoning may be alarmist in its approach. While it
is most likely true that shippers rarely read liability limiting clauses until a loss
occurs, and even more rarely choose a carrier based on favorable liability limit-
ing practices, it is submitted that it would not be as difficult as the commentator
suggests for carriers to comply with the requirements of the released value doc-
trine. Air carriers could include a notice on all air bills stating that alternate
freight services, providing varying degrees of protection, are available for ship-
pers. The specifics of these alternate services could be kept at the shipping
desks much like the passenger timetables which currently occupy a prominent
position on ticket counters. For shippers using a SPRINT-type courier service,
these alternate rate pamphlets could be available at the passenger ticket coun-
ters because the packages are often delivered directly to this location.
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